Morality and the Internalized Other

Often, when Freud mentioned morality, he was referring to a culture's restrictions on sexual behavior--a code regularly endorsed yet routinely defied. He was deeply interested in exposing the reasons for such restrictive sexual codes, and the dynamics of our deviations from them. Still, for Freud, it is not the sexual content nor the societal enforcement of certain constraints that makes them moral; moral constraints are, rather, constraints that play a particular role within the psychology of individuals--namely, the role of "super-ego". While the emergence of a super-ego is, according to Freud, bound up with the dynamics of sexual desire in general and the Oedipal complex in particular, in the end it is the relational properties and not the content of the super-ego--specifically, its historical relations to other people and its ongoing relations to the ego--that make it a super-ego and make it the agency of morality. An account of the formation and the character of the super-ego is, then, simultaneously an account of the formation and the character of morality.

To understand Freud's account of the superego, and the closely related ego ideal, we must understand how a self or an ego is constituted and how characteristics of other people may be internalized to become parts of oneself. This story forms the crucial metapsychological background for Freud's account of morality, and I offer a somewhat novel interpretation of this background in sections (1) and (2) below. Section (3) discusses the seemingly paradoxical situation in which an internalized other retains its otherness, and section (4) explores the distinction between the super-ego and the ego ideal. In the final section, I try to locate Freud's account of morality with respect to some available options, and I defend it against some likely objections.

1. Consciousness and the Deflections of Desire

According to Freud, our fundamental desires or drives are few, the many and various desires we regularly experience being the result of more or less elaborate deflections and transformations of these. At its most basic, a desire is directed towards some object or end whose attainment causes the satisfaction of the desire and the release of the energy which sustains it. If the object or end is not attainable, however, the desire will seek release through substitute objects. Almost any object may substitute for another as long as the person in some way associates the two, but the closer and the richer the associations--similar appearances, physical proximity, similar-sounding names, etc.--the more satisfying and
stable the substitutions. A single desire may be deflected onto several new objects and several distinct desires may be deflected onto a single object; these are the so-called "primary processes" of displacement and condensation--processes which take place automatically, driven by the pressure of unreleased desire and rewarded by the pleasure of regained equilibrium. Because almost all substitute objects are imperfect substitutes, however, the acquisition of a substitute object seldom results in the complete satisfaction of one's original desire; hence, one's original desire will tend to remain active to some extent and the processes of deflection and condensation will continue indefinitely.

This unconscious 'logic' of desire--of substitution through association--is often at odds with the logic of conscious thought. Whatever the qualitative similarities between a mark on the tablecloth today and the desired mark on the sheets of years ago, consciously we know that the former is no substitute for the latter. This is because conscious thoughts (i.e. thoughts which are part of the system Cs, and governed by the so-called "secondary processes") are sensitive to temporal ordering, to causal laws, and to disanalogies--they are answerable to the constraints of reality, as it were--whereas unconscious thoughts (i.e. thoughts which are part of the system Ucs) answer only to the demands of imagination and pleasure, for which temporal order, causal laws, and negative facts are irrelevant. Since we can never be conscious of all of our thoughts, and since consciousness often denies a desire its object (or, indeed, denies the desire itself), some reliance on and reversion to the unconscious logic of desire is inevitable. And, at bottom, it is by appeal to the conflict and the fluctuation between these two modes of thought--between conscious and unconscious processing, or between thought in accordance with the reality principle and thought in accordance with the pleasure principle--that Freud attempts to explain many cases of (apparent) irrationality.

Bound up with the capacity for conscious thought are two other, related capacities: (a) the capacity to acknowledge one's own subjectivity--to acknowledge one's thoughts as thoughts, or one's point of view as a point of view, and (b) the capacity to use a language. Freud is quite explicit about each of these connections. Unconscious processes, he asserts, "equate reality of thought with external actuality, and wishes with their fulfillment" such that "the antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the first". With regard to language, Freud writes "the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone. ... [A] presentation which is not put into words ... remains thereafter in the Unconscious". The claim is not merely that consciousness employs a language, rather that it is the employment of a language which makes one conscious.

Freud does not, however, explain why the capacity to recognize subjectivity and the
capacity for language should both be correlated with and, indeed, definitive of consciousness. We might venture the following on his behalf: a subjective point of view is a subjective point of view for the same reason that a language is a language--namely, it is capable of representing the world as being a certain way whether or not the world is in fact that way; both a subject and a language must be capable of representation at a distance and, more importantly, they must be capable of misrepresentation. Acknowledging subjectivity and using a language as a language both presuppose the recognition of this possibility--the possibility of misrepresentation and, hence, the possibility of representation itself. It is the recognition of this possibility which, for Freud, seems to constitute the essence of consciousness.8

This interpretation of what Freud means by consciousness helps to explain Freud's shift away from the conscious/unconscious contrast towards the ego/id contrast: if the emergence of consciousness is equivalent to the emergence of a recognition of one's own subjectivity, it is also equivalent to the identification and delineation of a self or an ego. The id, in contrast, is an assortment of desires, wholly directed towards their objects and wholly oblivious to their subjective character.

The above interpretation of Freud's notion of consciousness may help to explain two otherwise puzzling claims made by Freud: (1) the claim that emotions must be conscious, and (2) the claim that thought is experimental action.9 As long as an impulse remains unconscious, it will be freely deflected from one object to another without regard to their causal relevance to the original object of one's desire, and it will immediately issue in actions directed at these objects without regard to the likely success of those actions. The impulse or desire, as long as it remains unconscious, will not be withheld or suspended pending a future appearance of its original object or an opportunity for more effective action. Emotion, however, seems to require just such frustration and suspension of desire; in anger, for example, one's most immediate destructive impulses are outwardly restrained but inwardly sustained. Emotion establishes a subjective as opposed to an objective site of action. So, too, with thought. In thought, I create a desired state of affairs inwardly rather than outwardly (I imagine it, I represent it), and this enables me to experiment with various possibilities and outcomes prior to committing myself to any one of them. Thus in thought, as in emotion, I withdraw to a subjective realm. But since the contrast between the subjective and the objective, or between the imaginary and the real, can only be grasped through consciousness (as Freud understands it), both emotion and thought (versus desire and belief, or impulse and cognition) will indeed depend on consciousness.

2. The Inner and the Outer
In attaining a sense of self—i.e. in attaining consciousness, or attaining an ego—boundaries between myself and other things must be drawn. Fixing the physical and the psychological boundaries of a self, however, is a complicated and ongoing process. Desire is possessive, seeking to incorporate things we like into ourselves, while disowning things we dislike, seeking to expel them from ourselves. At a very basic level, this is manifested in our attempts to draw desirable objects towards and into our bodies while pushing away or pulling back from objects we dislike. (Children's preoccupation with various bodily orifices is not due merely to the fact that they are the sites of vivid sensations; capable of ingesting, retaining or expelling material, they are also the sites of engrossing ambiguities concerning what is and is not mine, what does and does not belong to me.) At a more abstract level, though, it is properties that are owned or disowned in accordance with desire: we tend to attribute desirable features to ourselves (we "introject" them) while attributing undesirable features to things outside ourselves (we "project" them). So, for example, a child will view his difficulty with a toy as a problem with the toy, not himself, yet will view an accomplishment brought about through a parent's intervention as his own accomplishment, not that of the parent—a tendency which is not, of course, confined to children, and one which may be reversed when self-confidence is undermined.

With the ability to recognize other people as psychological wholes—personalities that combine both good and bad properties in distinctive ways, comes the possibility of internalizing not just individual properties of another but whole personalities. When I take a whole person rather than a selected aspect of some person as the object of my desire, the possession or incorporation of that object requires the internalization of a whole personality; satisfaction of my desire thus requires that I fantasize the internal presence of the desired person rather than merely the desired properties of that person. The result is the internal presence of not only the loved but also the hated aspects of the internalized other; in imaginatively acquiring that which I desire, I may also consign myself to the continued presence of much that I despise.

Just which people I internalize will depend on which people are most regularly the objects of intense but unsatisfied desire—those whom I most regularly and intensely desire to possess or control yet am usually unable to possess or control. Typically, and initially, the internalized other will be one's mother or one's father, for they are typically the objects of one's strongest desires and they are the people whom one first comes to see as psychological wholes. Eventually and in principle, though, any influential other may be internalized. Note, though, that it is my inability to fully possess or control others that both demonstrates their independence from me and creates the need to resort to fantasy in order to satisfy my desires; so some experience of conflict between my desires or actions and those of another is a
precondition for my internalization of that person. The internalization of another is a way to imaginatively possess and retain a desired person who, in fact, cannot be possessed or retained.

The internalization of a desired person is an alternative to and, in effect, a compromise between two other options in the face of frustration: deflection of one's desire to new (external) objects, and retreat to narcissism (whereby oneself becomes the new object of desire). One is continually confronted with a choice between redirecting desires outward, never wholly successfully, and redirecting desires inward, effectively withdrawing from the world. Internalization offers a third alternative; for with internalization, one's desires remain directed towards their original object, but that object is withdrawn from the external world and 'housed' within.

3. Identification and Otherness

The internalization of another does not necessarily give rise to a super-ego. To the extent that we are able to simply add another's desires and personality traits to our own or to replace our previous desires and traits with those of someone else, the internalization of another will amount, rather, to a kind of merger with that person. Given the frequency of conflict between the desires and personalities of different people, and given the difficulty of relinquishing one's most basic desires and dispositions, however, the internalization of another will normally engender some internal conflict. This introduces a question, familiar from current discussions of personal identity and self-deception, about how two apparently distinct and conflicting personalities might nonetheless comprise a single person.

Freud did not consider this to be an idle question, answerable by mere stipulation. He explicitly rejected the idea that the contrast between conscious and unconscious mental states, for example, could be understood on the model of two interacting selves for, on his view, the Unconscious or the id is not a self at all.

This process of inference...leads logically to the assumption of another, second consciousness which is united in one's self, with the consciousness one knows. But...a consciousness of which its own possessor knows nothing is something very different from a consciousness belonging to another person, and it is questionable whether such a consciousness, lacking, as it does, its most important characteristic, deserves any discussion at all. ...[W]hat is proved is not the existence of a second consciousness in us, but the existence of psychical acts which lack consciousness. On Freud's view, the Unconscious or the id cannot be considered a separate self because, as we have already suggested, creating a self is of a piece with becoming conscious. Thus,
although the drives of the id (of the system Ucs) certainly are in some important sense mine, they are not part of my ego or my self until as they are taken up by consciousness.

An internalized other, clearly, may be aligned with either the system Cs or the system Ucs, depending on whether its desires and beliefs are acknowledged or not. Its otherness, however, will depend on its opposition to one's conscious self. (Opposition wholly within the Unconscious not only fails to be opposition to one's self but, what actually comes to the same thing, it fails to sustain itself as an opposition for, as we saw earlier, it immediately resolves itself through the workings of displacement and condensation.) To the extent that an internalized other is unconscious, its opposition to oneself will amount to a rebellion against the regimentation imposed by consciousness; for consciousness is simply the agency through which previously unconscious material confronts the reality principle, and through which prudence is enforced. To the extent that an internalized other is conscious, on the other hand, it will amount to a set of second-order desires regarding one's conscious, first-order desires. In either case, the internalized other retains its otherness only insofar as it directs its desires towards aspects of one's self rather than towards objects in the external world—hence, a super-ego (an "Uber-Ich"). The super-ego is precisely that part of a person that remains opposed to or critical of the ego.

Acknowledging the superego--i.e. becoming conscious of it without actually identifying oneself with it--thus depends on acknowledging its role as an overseer of the ego. Initially, of course, it is other people--parents, in particular--who 'oversee' our actions and decisions; and when they are internalized, it is precisely in their role as overseers that they retain the independence from the self that is necessary for a super-ego, or a moral 'conscience'.

We may reject the existence of an original, as it were natural, capacity to distinguish good from bad. What is bad is often not at all what is injurious or dangerous to the ego; on the contrary, it may be something which is desirable and enjoyable to the ego. Here, therefore, there is an extraneous influence at work, and it is this that decides what is to be called good or bad. ... A great change takes place only when the authority is internalized through the establishment of a super-ego. The phenomena of conscience then reach a higher stage. Actually, it is not until now we should speak of conscience...

Our earlier remarks about consciousness and language may now help to explain why the super-ego is typically experienced as an inner voice. Points of view must be spatially distinguished, so that looking at myself from another's point of view requires that I view myself in relation to a real or imaginary other that remains outside of my physical self. What that other 'sees' in me, then, will depend on what is publicly displayed and what is
visible from the particular vantage point occupied by the other. I will modify my behavior in response to another that continues to be conceived of as external to me. Another's voice, on the other hand, need not be experienced as spatially external to me; to be distinct from mine, it is enough that it address itself to me, or carry on a conversation with me. Thus, unlike the gaze of another, the voice of another may influence me as I merely deliberate about what to do; it will influence mere intentions to act. The super-ego, as inner voice, oversees my conscious (hence, articulated) desires, not just the results of those desires; it comments on what my ego is, not just what it does.

Originally, renunciation of instinct was the result of fear of an external authority: one renounced one's satisfactions in order not to lose its love. If one has carried out this renunciation, one is, as it were, quits with the authority and no sense of guilt should remain. But with fear of the super-ego the case is different. Here, instinctual renunciation is not enough, for the wish persists and cannot be concealed from the super-ego. Thus, in spite of the renunciation that has been made, a sense of guilt comes about.\(^\text{13}\)

4. **Judges and Ideals**

Freud thought of the super-ego as a harsh judge--harsher, in fact, than the parents or other authorities from which it is derived. I have already suggested two reasons for this. First, it is only those parts of another that stand over and against the self that, when internalized, retain their otherness. Aspects of an internalized other that easily merge with one's preexisting self will not be experienced as other; they will be assimilated into the ego (or id) rather than contribute to the character of a super-ego. Second, unlike real judges of our actions, the internal critic which is the super-ego observes our every thought, and thus recognizes the pervasiveness of our sins.

There is, however, another important reason for the harshness of the super-ego according to Freud. One of the features of our parents (and of adults in general) that we covet most is their power. As children, we seek control of our environment but are constantly confronted by others who wield greater power and who seek to control us. Furthermore, great as an adult's power may be, a child is bound to perceive it as still greater since adults' power tends to be most marked in their dealings with children and since adults' intervention tends to focus on just those desires--sexual desires and aggressive desires, for example--which are most intense. Desire for the parent's power thus becomes a prime reason for internalization of a parent figure, and the internalized parent figure thus becomes particularly powerful. Note, however, that the parent's power, now (imaginatively) possessed
through internalization, remains power exerted over the child's ego or self. This allows two things to occur, strengthening the harshness of the super-ego still further. First, the super-ego may align itself with the id in its attack on the ego:

The way in which the super-ego came into being explains how it is that the early conflicts of the ego with the object-cathexes of the id can be continued in conflicts with their heir, the super-ego. If the ego has not succeeded in properly mastering the Oedipus complex, the energetic cathexis of the latter, springing from the id, will come into operation once more in the reaction-formation of the ego ideal. 14

And:

Thus the super-ego is always close to the id and can act as its representative vis-a-vis the ego. 15

Second, insofar as the child has projected its own aggressiveness and hostility towards a parent onto that parent, he must now contend with that hostility as it is directed back towards himself:

His aggressiveness is introjected, internalized; it is, in point of fact, sent back to where it came from—that is, it is directed towards his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience', is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon the other, extraneous individuals. 16

Much as Freud emphasizes the harsh and aggressive aspects of the super-ego, he also, at times, seems to grant it a more positive role. He recognizes that we admire as well as fear our parents, and he speaks of an "ego ideal" as well as of a superego. 17 The two are closely related aspects of a single phenomenon, it seems, in so far as they both come about through the internalization of the qualities of another which one desires but cannot have. And just as a child's conception of a parent's power is typically an exaggeration, so too is the child's conception of a parent's virtue; the ego ideal stands apart from the self partly on account of its idealized character. 18 In its role as judge, the super-ego stands over the self as an aggressive critic while, in its role as an ideal, it stands over one as a possibility to which one aspires. In its response to the super-ego as ideal, the ego experiences a longing to improve while, in its response to the super-ego as judge, the ego experiences the anxiety of anticipated failure. 19

On one view of the matter, these two sides of the super-ego may be seen to cooperate: one setting the standards and the other enforcing them. Unfortunately, however, the stronger each aspect is, the more likely they are to work against rather than with each other. In setting oneself an unreachable goal and then condemning oneself for not being all
that one should be, the stage is set for a debilitating sense of failure and self-loathing.

[T]he more virtuous a man is, the more severe and distrustful is his behaviour, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried saintliness furthest who reproach themselves for the worst sinfulness. This means that virtue forfeits some part of its promised reward; the docile and continent ego does not enjoy the trust of its mentor, and it strives in vain, it would seem, to acquire it.20

Much as Freud viewed the creation of a super-ego and an ego ideal as essential to morality and to civilization itself, he worried about the results of their increasing strength in European civilization and religion. The presence of excessive internal demands and internal ideals tend to debilitate us with frustration and desire which is, eventually, bound to erupt in rebellious delinquency--individually and as a society.21 Thus, a weakening of the super-ego and the ego-ideal were seen by Freud as generally desirable. To accomplish this, he favored more lenient parenting and more lenient social codes. Also, and more importantly, though, he favored strengthening and expanding the ego--i.e. consciously acknowledging and prudentially managing more aspects of oneself--so as to lessen the oppressive character of one's super-ego. Indeed, to the extent to which one is able to truly understand the character of one's super-ego--its sources and its tactics--one becomes able either to extricate oneself from its demands (by realizing unrealistic these demands are, for example) or to make its demands one's own (thereby transforming super-ego into ego).

5. Morality

Freud considered the presence of a super-ego--an inner critic and ideal--and the presence of a moral sense to be one and the same. This is a tempting equation, if morality is taken to require actions which oppose one's self-interest. The existence of a super-ego explains how it is that we may act in the service of something over and above our self-interest--i.e. the interests of the ego--despite the absence of any external enforcement or reward, and it explains how it is that we may feel required--i.e. commanded--to act against our self-interest.

Not all conceptions of morality require moral acts to be acts which oppose or disregard self-interest, nor do all conceptions of morality insist that moral acts be experienced as obligatory. Aristotle's account of morality, for example, makes no such assumptions. Freud's identification of a moral sense with a super-ego, however, only makes sense is morality must be both selfless and dutiful. If this seems an overly narrow (and overly German) conception of morality, two things might be said on Freud's behalf. First, there are many different and contested ways of distinguishing moral matters from ethical matters more generally. Fixing the boundaries of the moral is at least partly a stipulative matter, and the stipulations implicit in Freud's account
of morality are certainly not unusual in contemporary thought. Second, it must be remembered that Freud is not endorsing the morality he seeks to analyze. He did not hold that a stronger moral sense was always a better thing (either for ourselves or for others); indeed, as noted above, he usually recommended a weakening of the super-ego and, hence, a weakening of our moral sense.22

Freud's conception of morality—as involving acts opposed to or indifferent to self-interest, and as involving a sense of obligation or duty—may be accepted, of course, without yet accepting his identification of a moral sense with a super-ego. Kant, for example, sought to derive obligations opposed to self-interest from the obligations of reason alone. His position, though, invites questions concerning the medium through which obligations are felt—the motivational basis for morality. Kant's blanket dismissal of inclinations as a basis for morality (because that would make duties contingent rather than necessary) seems to leave us without any basis at all; his appeal to the will seems only to invoke a special sort of inclination—a sort which floats free of self-interest, operating on the (phenomenal) self rather than from it. This, though, is precisely what Freud sought to capture in his account of the super-ego: the possibility of an inner agent which transcends and acts on the experienced self. His account of the super-ego is a naturalistic counterpart to Kant's account of the noumenal self, with the commands of the super-ego replacing the commands of the will. In some important respects, then, Freud's position should be seen as accommodating rather than competing with that of Kant.

Worries may remain, of course, concerning the content and the legitimacy of the super-ego's demands. The super-ego, after all, promotes the (often arbitrary) commands of particularly influential people rather than the (supposedly) impartial commands of reason. Can our moral sense depend so completely on the personalities and pronouncements of those we have internalized? Freud's answer, I suspect, would be another question: what else could it depend on? Once one accepts naturalism, the appeal to processes of internalization seems inevitable. It must be remembered, though, that internalized parents tend to be idealizations of actual parents. A child's perception of her parent is exaggerated and over-simplified in various ways, and after the parent is internalized, its personality will continue to stray from that of the actual parent—both because it is no longer dependent on the external reality of that person, and because it will gradually become an amalgamate of many different personalities that have been similarly internalized. Thus the super-ego, although based on very particular individuals, tends to become a more abstract representative of societal authorities and societal ideals in general.

For this reason, it is unlikely that one's super-ego could be formed in such a way as to regularly command wickedness. Whatever parents themselves do, the commands they give
to children and the ideals they espouse to children tend to accord with those of the society at large; and even if parents fail to espouse and enforce the norms of the society, others will eventually contribute to the formation of a super-ego so as to bring it more in line with societal norms. This does not, of course, guarantee that every super-ego commands only good things. But this will be true on any account of a moral sense: what I feel or think I ought to do will not always be what I actually ought to do.

The power and the appeal of Freud's account of morality, at least as I have laid it out here, do not depend on its specifically sexual sources—the story of how the super-ego emerges from the Oedipal complex, or the equation of moral anxiety with castration anxiety, for example. Its power and its appeal lie, rather, with its ability to make sense of dutiful selflessness within a naturalistic psychology. Freud accomplishes this through an account of the internalization of others—an account that I have tried both to elaborate and to defend. Whether or not one accepts this as an account of morality, it ought to help clarify an important aspect of our psychology—namely, the means by which the imagined presence of another may (for better or for worse) continue to control one's actions and intentions.  

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1) Freud's view of the nature and number of basic drives changes over time, and it is never very precise. In "Instincts and Their Viscissitudes" he suggests that there are two groups of primal instincts--the sexual instincts and the self-preservative instincts, adding that "this supposition has not the status of a necessary postulate...it is merely a working hypothesis" (1915c: XIV, pp.120-121). By Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a: XXI, p.59), the crucial distinction has become that between Eros and Thanatos, life-preserving and life-destroying instincts. See Freud's note reviewing the evolution of his position at the end of "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920g: XVIII, p.7), and see his Introductory Lectures (1916-17: XV, p.413) where he discounts the importance of determining sameness versus difference of basic instincts.

2) The reinforcing effect of multiple associations between an original object of desire and substitute objects is especially clear in Freud's analysis of some of his own dreams--e.g. in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a: IV, pp.282-4), and in his analysis of the Ratman's obsession--e.g. in "A Case of Obsessional Neurosis"(1909d:X, pp.213-17).

3) I refer to the case of a woman whose husband who was impotent on their wedding night, discussed by Freud in his Introductory Lectures, (1916-17: XVI, pp.261-4).

4) These contrasts between conscious mental processes and unconscious mental processes are stated most explicitly in "The Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1911b: XII, p.215) and in "The Unconscious"(1915e: XIV, p.186).

5) I discuss and defend what Freud calls the "special characteristics of the system Ucs", and I consider their bearing on his analysis of the Schreber case and the Wolfman case in my contribution to Freud: problems of explanation (Routledge and Kegan Paul, forthcoming).

6) Quotes are from "The Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1911b: XII, p.225) and "Negation" (1925h: XIX, p.237).

7) From "The Unconscious" (1915e: XIV, p. 207). See, also, "The Ego and the Id" (1923b: XIX, p.20 & p.25).

8) Freud actually wrote a paper on consciousness which has now been lost. Clearly, by the
time he wrote "The Unconscious", the term "consciousness", aligned with the system Cs, had acquired a somewhat technical meaning for Freud. Just how similar his theoretical concept is to our ordinary concept(s) of consciousness (or the rather different German concept of "Bewusstsein") is an open question.

9) Regarding (a), see Section III of "The Unconscious" (1915e: XVI, pp.177-179). Regarding (b), see "Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1911b: XII, p.219), "The Interpretation of Dreams" (1900a: IV-V), Jokes (1905c: VIII, pp.191-2), and "Negation" (1925h: XIX, p.237).

10) See Freud's discussion of this possibility in "On Narcissism" (1914c: XIV, p.69) paper and in "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917e: XIV, p.239).

11) "The Unconscious" (1915e: XIV, p.170).


14) "The Ego and the Id" (1923b: XIX, pp. 38-39).


17) The editor's introduction to "The Ego and the Id" (1923b: XIX, p.9-11), recounts various stages in Freud's development of the notion of an ego ideal and a super-ego.

18) In his paper "On Narcissism: an Introduction" (1914c: XIV, p.101), Freud also describes the formation of an ego ideal as a means of recovering the lost narcissism of infancy: "He is not willing to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood; and when, as he grows up, he is disturbed by the admonitions of others and by the awakening of his own critical judgment, so that he can no longer retain that perfection, he seeks to recover it in the new form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal."
19) The word we translate as "conscience" is the German "Gewissenangst". Freud makes the anxiety component of this concept explicit and relates it to the Oedipal complex: "Just as the father has become depersonalized in the shape of the super-ego, so has the fear of castration at his hands become transformed into an undefined social or moral anxiety. But this anxiety is concealed. The ego escapes it by obediently carrying out the commands, precautions and penances that have been enjoined on it. If it is impeded in doing so, it is at once overtaken by an extremely distressing feeling of discomfort which may be regarded as an equivalent of anxiety and which the patients themselves liken to anxiety." ("Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926d: XX, p.128).


21) This worry is developed most fully in the final chapters of *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930a: XXI, p.59).

22) This reminder ought also to help counter some objections to Freud's portrayal of womwn as having a weaker moral sense than men (due to their less resolved Oedipal or Elektra complexes). Moral inferiority, in this sense, seems a good thing according to Freud.

23) I am particularly grateful to Sebastian Gardner and Jerome Neu for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.